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THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO HIJACKING
BENJAMIN

THE FEDERAL

0. DAVIS,

JR.t

GOVERNMENT has made the necessary re-

sponse to air piracy. We are committed to a policy of protecting
air travelers; we are pledged to bringing every air pirate, every air
saboteur, and every person who attacks an aviation facility to justice.
Yet, the Government has never tried to gain these ends through harsh
or unreasonable edicts. The federal antihijacking campaign has been
conducted with a judicious regard for all of the parties and all of the
interests concerned. We have considered the demands of free enterprise, the rights of the individual, the sanctity of personal privacy, and

the responsibilities of all jurisdictions affecting civil aviation. Before
there was a regulatory program, there was a voluntary program and
the air carriers acted under Government guidance and assistance. Only
when it became evident that stronger measures were needed to meet
the menace of the hijacker did the Government act. We have taken
the security steps that fit the demand, the necessary steps.
Let me state very emphatically that present policies were not born
of desperation or the belated repair of an inadequate program. Antihijack efforts have been working well over the past 3 years and the
figures bear it out.1 1969 was the worst year in the annals of air piracy
in this country; it was also the year that the federal deterrent system
was initiated by the Nixon Administration. In 1969, there were 40
attempts to seize aircraft in the United States and 33 of them, or
82 per cent, were successful. In October of 1969, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) deterrence program was established on a voluntary basis. 1970 saw 27 hijacking attempts, 67 per cent of which
were successful. In 1971, air criminals struck on 27 occasions, but on
only 12 of them were they able to take over the aircraft. The hijack
rate was down to 44 per cent successful. Last year, there were 31
incidents and three United States air carrier planes were diverted to

Cuba. But of the 31 hijack attempts, only 10, or 32 per cent, were
successful. We had gone from a success ratio of 82 per cent down to
less than half that percentage.
The logical question is: Why, then, did the Government feel compelled to issue an emergency order in December 1972? The answer
t Assistant Secretary for Safety and Consumer Affairs, United States Dep't
of Transp., Lt. Gen. USAF, ret.
1. These and other figures referred to by the author are those of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) contained in Departmental chronology and are
not part of any published statistical data.
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lies in the nature of the last two hijackings to Cuba. They occurred in
the fall, just 12 days apart, and both incidents were violent and bloody.
Several weeks later, the Government announced its action.
On December 5, 1972, at the direction of the President, the Secretary of Transportation announced a strengthened aviation security program designed to protect air travelers against threats and acts of violence by air hijackers.2 The new program was set forth in an emergency
order and amendments to the existing regulations governing aviation
security issued by the Federal Aviation Administrator.'
2. Emergency Order of FAA, U.S. Dep't of Transp. Press Release No. 103-72
(Dec. 5, 1972). See 37 Fed. Reg. 25934 (1972), wherein it is stated that:
The President has directed that the present Civil Aviation Security Program
be strengthened to meet the escalating threats of hijacking, extortion, sabotage,
and terrorism against U.S. civil air commerce. The strengthened security
measures ordered by the President recognize the proper delineation of responsibilities between the Federal Government, airlines, airports, and local law
enforcement.
3. 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.1(e), .4 (1973); 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1973). There are
two aspects to the regulations regarding hijacking. One set of regulations imposes
responsibilities upon airlines; the other imposes responsibilities upon airport operators.
14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1973) requires each certificate holder (air carrier engaging in
interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation under a certificate of public convenience and necessity or other appropriate economic authority issued by the Civil
Aeronautics Board; and commercial operator engaging in intrastate common carriage covered by 14 C.F.R. § 121.7 (1972) to submit for approval by the Federal
Aviation Administrator a security program which includes:
(a) A screening system acceptable to the Administrator that is designed to
prevent or deter the carriage aboard its aircraft of any explosive or incendiary device or weapon in carry-on baggage on or about the persons of
passengers other than
(1) officials or employees of a municipality or a State, or of the United
States, who are authorized to carry arms; and
(2) crewmembers and other persons authorized by the certificate holder
to carry arms; and
(b) Procedures or facilities or a combination thereof that it uses or intends to
use to support that program and that are designed to:
(1) prevent or deter unauthorized access to its aircraft;
(2) assure that baggage is checked in by a responsible agent or representative of the certificate holder; and
(3) prevent cargo and checked baggage from being loaded aboard its
aircraft unless handled in accordance with the certificate holder's
security procedures.
The Administrator is authorized by 14 C.F.R. § 12 1.53 8 (g) (1973) to issue
emergency amendments to security programs filed by certificate holders. Under the
authority of subparagraph (g) (1) of that regulation, the Administrator by telegram
ordered all security programs amended effective January 5, 1973, to provide that the
certificate holder not permit any passenger to board its aircraft unless:
(a) The carry-on baggage items are inspected to detect weapons, explosives,
or other dangerous objects, and
(b) Each passenger is cleared by a detection device without indication of unaccounted for metal on his/her person (hand-held detection units may be used
until walk-through units are available), or
(c) In the absence of a detector, each passenger has submitted to a consent
search prior to boarding.
14 C.F.R. § 107 (1973) requires airport operators to implement facilities and
procedures designed to prevent or deter unauthorized access to air operations areas
and to submit for approval by the Administrator a security program designed to
improve these facilities and procedures. The emergency amendment to 14 C.F.R.
§ 107.4 (1973), required that those facilities and procedures include provision of law
enforcement support for all boardings of certificate holders covered by 14 C.F.R.
§ 121.538 (1973), and of foreign air carriers requesting such support.
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Since January 5, 1973, air carriers have been required to electronically screen all enplaning passengers as a condition to boarding
or reboarding.4 If a passenger activates the electronic weapons detector
and is unable to satisfactorily explain the presence of metal on his
person, the airline must refuse boarding privileges unless he consents
to a "frisk" or exterior clothing pat-down. The air carriers are also
required to inspect all carry-on items, including hand luggage, purses,
and packages, to insure that weapons, explosives, and other dangerous
articles are not carried aboard the aircraft.5
The airport operators have also been given added responsibilities.
Under an emergency rule effective February 6,6 they are required to insure that armed local law enforcement officers are stationed at passenger checkpoints throughout the passenger screening process.7 The
law enforcement officer must remain at the passenger checkpoint until
the aircraft has taxied away from the boarding area and he must return to his station in the event the aircraft returns to the boarding
area prior to takeoff. 8 The local law enforcement officers have orders
to support airline and airport security measures and to act in the event
of suspected or actual unlawful activities.
It should be clearly understood that the procedures announced in
December were not unprecedented. As early as September 1970, the
President had announced that certain measures would be undertaken
to prevent air piracy, the most significant being the placement of sky
marshals on board certain flights.9 On March 9, 1972, following the
explosion of a bomb on board a jetliner and the discovery of an explosive device aboard another passenger aircraft, the President issued
a second statement announcing additional preventive actions including
the issuance of new federal security requirements.10 Airlines and airport operators were thereby required by law to improve their security,
and all airlines operating in the United States were encouraged to use
a passenger screening system. This approach recognized a concept of
4. This was accomplished by amendment to security programs filed under 14
C.F.R. § 121.538 (1973). See note 3 supra.
5. Id.
6. 14 C.F.R. § 107.4 (1973). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a temporary restraining order staying the effective date of
the rule on February 5, 1973. On February 12, 1973, the district court denied a
motion for preliminary injunction and permitted the rule to go into effect. Airport
Operators Council Int'l v. Shaffer, 354 F. Supp. 79 (D.D.C. 1973). The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied a stay pending
appeal, Airport Operators Council Int'l v. Shaffer, Civil No. 209-73 (D.C. Cir.,
Feb. 15, 1973) (per curiam), and the rule became effective on February 16, 1973.
7. 14 C.F.R. § 107.4(a) (1973).
8. 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.4(b)-(c) (1973).
9. 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1193-94 (Sept. 11, 1970).
10. 8 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 553 (Mar. 9, 1972).
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interception; the potential hijacker was to be stopped before he could
board an aircraft.
The federal antiskyjack campaign intensified in the spring of
1972. In May, the FAA announced the purchase of $3.5 million worth
of electronic screening devices. In July, the President ordered 100 per
cent screening of all passengers and carry-on items boarding nonreservation or "shuttle-type flights" of certain airlines." Also, the
entire federal civil aviation security program underwent a critical reexamination by the Department of Transportation (DOT) during the
summer of 1972. The DOT's Office of Transportation Security was
looking for the answers to three pressing questions: (1) how best to
improve the program as it then existed; (2) how best to utilize technological improvements in security, such as metal detectors and lowwattage X-ray machines, which were then in production and would be
available in the near future; and (3) how to build into the program
the flexibility necessary to respond to the different kinds of hijackings.
Until that time, excluding deranged people, we had encountered two
types of air pirates in the United States. The first was the person who
wanted to fly to a sanctuary, usually Cuba, and who was content just to
reach his destination. The second was a person who wanted a large
sum of money in a hurry and would hold the airliner, its passengers,
and crew for ransom. The Government saw the second type as the
greater threat to life and property, and began broadening its plans
to deal with him. By September 1972, the Office of Transportation
Security had completed its analysis and its recommendations were
under review. The expanded government security program began
taking shape.
Then, in late October, hijackers of a new breed struck a domestic
air facility. Four men forced their way onto an Eastern Airlines plane
in Houston and took it to Cuba. The four, already wanted for murder
and bank robbery, killed an Eastern employee and wounded another
in the hijacking process. Twelve days later, three wanted men boarded
a Southern Airways jet in Birmingham and sent it on a 29-hour,
five-stop flight to Havana, shooting and wounding the copilot on the
way. The gunmen had demanded and received ransom money from
Southern Airways amounting to an estimated $2 million.
Both of these hijackings were perpetrated by fugitives from justice,
violent men willing and able to shoot down anyone who stood in their
way. Human life was the least of their concerns. The immediate
problems that confronted the Government were how to cope with this
11. 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.

Doc.

1152 (July 17, 1972).
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new breed of air criminal and how to do it quickly before there was
a repetition with tragic results. Two concerns were paramount: (1)
the tightening of our screening procedures, since the Southern Airway
hijackers had succeeded in getting their weapons aboard the plane;
and (2) the ability to respond to violence in the boarding area, since
the Eastern Airlines hijackers had ruthlessly shot their way on board.
While routine screening of a few selected passengers might have
prevented a hijacking before, we now had to be prepared to stop air
criminals at the boarding gate and deny them access to the ramp area.
Our objective was to keep all weapons off all air carriers. With our
course determined, we considered the Office of Transportation Security's
analysis and recommendations and chose those measures which: (1)
were reasonable in the context of the emergency which existed; (2)
would achieve the goals of 100 per cent screening and security at the
passenger gates; and (3) could be implemented quickly. The President
was advised of our recommendations and requested that they be implemented as quickly as possible. On December 5, the Federal Aviation
Administrator issued the rule. 2
That is how and why the emergency procedures came about.
They were anything but a hastily contrived plan or the patchwork efforts of an ad hoc committee. All measures taken had been in the
planning stage so that we were ready when the occasion demanded.
It should be emphasized that imposition of the emergency procedures does not mean that other Government efforts have been abandoned. There is increasing impetus on Capitol Hill for legislation
to stop the hijacker. The substance of the emergency measures we
took in December was included in a bill passed by the Senate last
session."3 The bill was allowed to die in a House-Senate conference
but it was substantially revived as S. 39 when the 93d Congress convened in January. 4 This bill has already been passed by the Senate.15
S. 39 contains some provisions with which we agree and some
which we do not support. It requires the screening of passengers by
weapon detectors in language that strongly resembles the regulations
already issued by the FAA. However, the FAA order requires additional security measures; it directs the air carriers to deny boarding to
any person who is not cleared by the detection device and does not consent to the search of his person. The FAA regulations also require that
all carry-on items must be inspected prior to boarding.
12.
13.
14.
15.

37 Fed. Reg. 25934 (1972).
S. 2280, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
S. 39, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
119 CONG. REC. 3096 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1973).
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Much of S. 39 pertains to international efforts to curb air piracy.
We strongly support provisions in the bill which would implement, for
the United States, the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.16 The Convention obligates contracting
states to establish severe penalties for air piracy and requires the extradition or prosecution of hijackers. S. 39 also would authorize the
President to suspend air service to any foreign nation which he determines to be encouraging the act of hijacking."
There is another feature of the Senate bill which we favor. That
is the proposal which would retain the present misdemeanor offense
for carrying weapons aboard an aircraft, or attempting to do so, while
making this offense a felony in instances where such an action is willful and taken without regard for the safety of human life. 8
The principal source of our disagreement with S. 39 is the provision which would establish a new security force within the FAA. 9
This provision is wholly inconsistent with our present civil aviation
security program and the FAA will continue to oppose it. This part
of the Senate measure imposes upon the federal government the chief
responsibility for providing law enforcement personnel at the 531 airports in the United States which serve the scheduled air carriers. We
believe very strongly that a federal role in the preventive aspects of
the civil aviation security program is unwarranted. It is an intrusion
into the jurisdictions and obligations of state and local governments
which raises the unwanted spectre of federal police power.
Proponents of the federal force, on both sides of the Senate aisle,
say that we have abdicated our responsibilities in requiring that local
police officers support the passenger screening process. We maintain
that this is properly a local duty and service. The need for police security
and crime prevention at an airport does not obligate the federal government any more than it does at any other public facility. There is
no federal force at a train station, or a bus depot, or a local sports
arena; local policemen are on hand to preserve order. The argument
is made that security at airports is for the protection of people traveling
in interstate commerce. However, state and local police personnel patrol
our interstate highway system, and the railroads and shipping terminals
provide their own security guards to protect passengers and cargo.
There are other compelling reasons why a federal security force
should not be created. It would be not only expensive, but wasteful.
16. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (effective Oct. 14, 1971).
17. S. 39, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1973).
18. S. 39, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 26 (1973).
19. S. 39, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 24 (1973).
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The waste in man-hours and nonproductive time for federal employees
would almost equal the financial costs. We can put this fact in perspective by estimating the number of aircraft departures in the United
States this year. During 1973, the scheduled air carriers will enplane
approximately 185 million passengers. An estimated 90 per cent of
those passengers will board at 87 airports and nearly 70 per cent will
be boarding at the 33 largest airports. That leaves 444 of the smaller
air carrier facilities with a minimal level of activity. One or two local
policemen could make the airport another stop on their assigned patrol
to back up the passenger screening process. Some 200 airports, for
example, enplane only about 50 passengers a day. There simply is not
a significant problem in providing guards at most of the airports in
the country. A federal officer is not needed.
This, in no way, abrogates the responsibility of federal law enforcement. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) responds immediately to a hijacking attempt; it investigates all incidents of air
piracy and brings the criminals to justice. But the FBI is not now
involved in the day-to-day business of local crime prevention.
It is normal enforcement procedure for local policemen to react
to violations of federal laws, as in the case of kidnapping and bank
robbery. In most states, the legal authority is there. According to the
Justice Department, 31 states authorize their local police officers to
arrest under federal statutes, either for misdemeanors or felonies, and
this would cover attempts to board an aircraft with a weapon.2" Of
the remaining states, eight of them do not authorize their law enforcement officers to make arrests without a warrant for federal misdemeanors.2 In 11 states, police officers are not authorized by law to
arrest without a warrant for any federal offense.2 2 However, it appears
that in each of the states where officers may not arrest for federal offenses, there is some state law which could be violated by a person
23
attempting to board 'an aircraft with a deadly or dangerous weapon.
Moreover, in at least two of these states there are statutes which
specifically make such conduct unlawful. 24 We believe that action by
the Congress as well as the state legislatures would be desirable in
closing the gaps between federal and state jurisdiction in these areas.
20.
21.
22.
23.

S. REP. No. 93-13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STATE ANN. § 53-206 (1960); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 94-3525 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269 (1969).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 84-1 (1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4760 (Supp.
1972).
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Much of the complaining about the law enforcement requirement
stems from the cost. The Administration is cognizant of and sensitive
to the pleas of state and local officials on the funding of enforcement
personnel. This is an honest misunderstanding of our policy. We have
not asked for a diversion of local tax revenues or other funds to pay
for the presence of armed guards. Instead, we have proposed that the
airport operators adjust or renegotiate the existing cost formulae and
contracts with their tenant air carriers or negotiate new contracts for
payment of airport security services. It is then up to the airline to
either absorb the cost or to initiate steps to request changes in the fare
25
structure.
We believe in the principle that the users of the air transportation
system should pay for the costs, including those for police officers. All
costs related to the federal aviation security program, we believe, should
be a part of the total cost of the system. Security-related costs should
not be borne alone by the local airport, or the air carrier, or the community. It is proper that the new expense be reflected in the fare
structure.
The financial aspects of the security requirements cannot be minimized, but they should not serve to cloud the primary issue - safety.
The federal program is designed to protect air travelers. In a matter of
just a few years, American commercial air lanes have become imperiled
by hijackers, and recently a new and vicious brand of air criminal has
emerged. Society may abhor a killer in its midst but the presence of
such a man aboard a crowded airliner is doubly terrifying. We simply
must prevent dangerous individuals with weapons from flying.
The Government is wholeheartedly committed to that purpose. We
want the cooperation of all elements of authority - federal, state, and
local - and the aviation industry. We seek to impress upon the traveling
public the reasons for our actions and to convince them that they are
the direct beneficiaries. We are succeeding.
We anticipate that Congress will pass the legislation this year that
we recommend to enhance the civil aviation security program. There
may be further revisions and rulemaking by the federal government.
The American citizen, especially the air traveler, may be assured of
one thing - we will do all that is necessary.
25. On March 22, 1973, the Civil Aeronautics Board granted Western Airlines
permission to add charges to travelers' tickets to help absorb the airline's costs for
the new security measures. Other airlines are expected to seek similar authority.
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